I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that is tied to the size of the misrepresentation. The main results concern the amount of information...

We study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender...

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...

The job market signaling model in Spence~(1973) deals with a situation of asymmetric information. Workers vary in their productivity. A worker is privately informed of his productivity but the firms are not informed. Spence~(1973) shows that in competitive markets, costly education may signal...

In an effort to address persistent consumer privacy concerns, policy makers and the data industry seem to have found common grounds in proposals that aim at making online privacy more “transparent.” Such self-regulatory approaches rely on, among other things, providing more and better...

This paper discusses the problem of defining marginal costs when integer variables are present, in the context of short-term power auctions. Most of the proposals for price computation existing in the literature are concerned with short-term competitive equilibrium (generators should not be...

We examine social media attention and sentiment from three major platforms: Twitter, StockTwits, and Seeking Alpha. We find that attention is highly correlated across platforms, but sentiment is not: its first principal component explains little more variation than purely idiosyncratic...

Using a robust textual analytic method, we decompose the P2P loan description into common and distinctive contents, which contain general and unique information provided by borrowers. We then investigate the role of the distinctive content in affecting P2P lending decisions and outcomes....

Institutional investors have significantly increased exposure to commodity futures especially oil futures after 2004 in a process called commodity market financialization, raising questions about the risk-sharing and price-discovery functions of the market. We propose an ARMA-GARCH R-vine copula...

We introduce a solution concept for signaling games, called Rational Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE). Beliefs are updated via Ortoleva’s (2012) Hypothesis Testing model, allowing for conditioning on information sets off the path. Hypotheses are beliefs about rational strategies of the...