Earlier research has associated spelling errors in resumes with reduced hiring chances. However, the analysis of hiring penalties due to spelling errors has thus far been restricted to white-collar occupations and relatively high numbers of errors per resume. Moreover, the mechanisms underlying...

We study whether there are improvements in worker-firm matching when employers and applicants can credibly signal their interest in a match. Using a detailed résumé dataset of more than 400 applicants from one university over five years, we analyze a matching process in which firms fill some...

We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete...

High-value preventive care is often underutilized. We study persuasion regarding the medical benefits of influenza vaccination by experimentally varying race concordance between sender and receiver, and, among Black respondents, a discordant sender's acknowledgement of historical injustice and...

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different...

This paper studies the problem of screening teams of either moral or altruistic agents, in a setting where agents choose whether or not to exert effort in order to achieve a high output for the principal. I show that there exists no separating equilibrium menu of contracts that induces the...