Purpose of the article: Based on the propositions of the signalling hypothesis and prospect theory, this study examined the extent of attempt by Nigerian deposit money banks (DMBs) to solve the issue of adverse selection via signalling their financial prospects using loan loss provisions (LLPs)....

A frequently cited explanation for why sterilized interventions may affect exchange rates is that these interventions signal central banks' future monetary policy intentions. This explanation presumes that central banks in fact back up interventions with subsequent changes in monetary policy. We...

This paper presents a signaling explanation for unemployment. The basic idea is that employment at an unskilled job may be regarded as a bad signal. Therefore, good workers who are more likely to qualify for employment at a skilled job in the future are better off being unemployed than accepting...

In this paper we analyze games in which there is trade between informed and uninformed players. The informed know the value of the trade (for instance, the value of their productivity in a labor market example); the uninformed only know the distribution of attributes among the informed. The...

A heterogeneous expectations model is provided, where private agents facing policy ignorance have to learn about the underlying fundamentals via a signal extraction problem. The model is estimated on a U.S. data set using Bayesian approach. The empirical results imply that the improvement in...

In the decade following the 2008 financial crisis, many advanced industrialized economies engaged in a competition to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), whose flows had plummeted following the global shock. At the same time, however, they also implemented or tightened Investment Screening...

A screening instrument is costly if it is socially wasteful and productive otherwise. A principal screens an agent with multidimensional private information and quasilinear preferences that are additively separable across two components: a one-dimensional productive component and a...

We hypothesised that people and companies non-anonymously donate to signal their intention to cooperate with observers; consequently, non-anonymous donation works as a coordination device between donors and observers. To test this, we conducted a laboratory experiment where a participant...