and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population … uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative …

and then submits one vote (simple plurality rule). We also assume that this is a Poisson voting game with population … uncertainty. The question is whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently so that the correct alternative …

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three …. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with … plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two …

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three …. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with … plurality rule when there are three alternatives as well. We characterize the set of inefficient equilibria with two alterna …