A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Spatial models of simple majority rule voting suggest that stable decisions are not likely to exist under normal circumstances. Yet this instability result stands in contrast to the stability observed in experiments. This article examines the effect of relaxing the assumption that voting is...

In an electoral framework of unidimensional two-candidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting, special interest groups present candidates with schedules that give the level of campaign contribution they will make for each feasible candidate policy location. Candidates, motivated by the...

Nondeterministic models of collective choice posit convergence among the outcomes of simple-majority decisions. The object of this research is to estimate the extent of convergence of majority choice under different procedural conditions. The paper reports results from a computer simulation of...

We consider a model of platform adaptation in spatial voting focussing on the effect of abstention on the stability of the mean voter equilibrium. Two distinct approaches for modeling abstention are explored: (1) voters abstain if party platforms are very much similar to each other and (2)...

We present some basic results concerning the spatial theory of voting in such a way that the theorems and their proofs should be accessible to a broad audience of political scientists. We do this by making the presentation essentially geometrical. We present the following results in particular:...