We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource...

Data from 692 subjects in 11 experimental treatments provide a systematic exploration of the existence and nature of reciprocal behavior in two-person games. The experimental design discriminates between motivations of reciprocity and (nonreciprocal) other-regarding preferences. The existence of...

A sequential-move version of a given normal-form game [Gamma] is an extensive-form game of perfect information in which each player chooses his action after observing the actions of all players who precede him and the payoffs are determined according to the payoff functions in [Gamma]. A...

We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) to operate under two types of contracts - tournaments (Ts) and fixed performance-standard contracts (F). Our results are consistent with the notion that subjects having social preferences for fairness and care about risk. That is, when subjects experience...

In the literature addressing the determinants of TV audiences in sports, both the absolute and relative playing strength of the opponents play a prominent role. Regarding national team competitions, however, this study conjectures that patriotism matters as well. Analyzing the Swiss TV audience...

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of...

This article develops a sequential game-theoretic model of heterogeneous producers to examine the market and welfare effects of cooperative involvement in process innovation activity in the agricultural sector. The analysis examines an open-membership, input-supplying cooperative (co-op) that...

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative externality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial location decision cannot be specified to an anonymous second...