This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there...

This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets...

Dynamic stability under the replicator dynamic of evolutionary game theory is investigated for certain symmetric extensive form games whose subgame structure exhibits a high degree of decomposability. It is shown that a pervasive equilibrium strategy is locally asymptotically stable (l.a.s.) if...

This paper considers one-machine sequencing situations in which agents are in a fixed initial order before the processing of the machine starts. The agents are allowed to rearrange positions to save costs w.r.t. the costs given by the initial order. We will assume that the agents are not certain...

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...