This paper introduces and analyzes sequentially stable outcomes in extensive games. An outcome ω is sequentially stable if for any ε 0, any version of the game where players make mistakes with small enough probability has a perfect ε-equilibrium with outcome close to ω. Unlike stable...

Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these...

Should a challenger face rivals simultaneously or sequentially? If sequentially, should he face weak or strong rivals first? To address these questions, we study signaling in dynamic contests, where a privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals. Against heterogenous opponents, the...

Partisan Gerrymandering is the self-interested manipulation of electoral boarder districts and is often criticised for leading to a misrepresentation of voter preferences. I use a dynamic contest model to show that such misrepresentation does not occur in a sequential Gerrymandering process. In...

This paper provides a fully fledged equilibrium analysis for two-player sequential-move contests with complete information, while allowing for a full spectrum of the contest's accuracy and players' asymmetry. For a strong-lead contest, an interior equilibrium (both players are active) prevails...