Search Results - subject:"Stable matching"

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Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents

Imamura, Kenzo; Konishi, Hideo - In: Dynamic games and applications : DGA 13 (2023) 2, pp. 497-509

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014327251

Stable and extremely unequal

Galichon, Alfred; Ghelfi, Octavia; Henry, Marc - In: Economics letters 226 (2023), pp. 1-3

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014313317

Online doctor-patient dynamic stable matching model based on regret theory under incomplete information

Zhao, Meng; Wang, Yajun; Zhang, Xueyi; Xu, Chang - In: Socio-economic planning sciences : the international … 87 (2023) 2, pp. 1-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014317703

Understanding popular matchings via stable matchings

Cseh, Ágnes; Faenza, Yuri; Kavitha, Telikepalli; … - 2020

against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching; another subclass of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290306

Popular matchings in complete graphs

Cseh, Ágnes; Kavitha, Telikepalli - 2020

Our input is a complete graph G on n vertices where each vertex has a strictranking of all other vertices in G. The goal is to construct a matching in G that is "globallystable" or popular. A matching M is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election againstany matching M': here each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012290307