We study a society of agents where individual incentives conflict with collective ones and thus individual utility maximization leads to inefficient outcomes. We assume that there is no functioning central institution which can control individual behavior. Instead, we analyze a system of what we...

We study the behavior of the optimal portfolio policy of a long-run investor in markets with stationary investment opportunity sets. We provide conditions on the utility function, for large wealth levels, which are sufficient for the optimal portfolio policy to approximate, as the trading...

We consider a two-station network with two types of jobs: type 0 jobs require service at station 1 only and type 1 jobs require service both at station 1 and 2 in sequence. Each station has a single server. The problem is to schedule the server at station 1 between the two types of jobs in order...

This paper offers the first economic analysis of wetlands mitigation banks. The banks are a new alternative for restoration of wetlands by developers before receiving regulatory approval for future development of wetlands in the same watershed. A stochastic optimal control model is developed...