Strategic commitments, such as promises and threats, pose several problems to the standard model of economic rationality: first, they can only arise when there is an incentive to free-ride; second, they need to be credible in order to manipulate the others' behaviour; third, once the commitment...

This paper shows how market entry into an unprofitable market can be profitable for a firm. A firm's expansion into a new market can have a beneficial feedback effect for that firm in its old market. By entering into a new market, the firm increases its produced quantity and has higher...

A central assumption in economics is that individuals are rational in the sense that they seek to satisfy their preferences, by choosing the action that maximizes a utility function that represents those preferences. However, it appears that in strategic interaction with other rational agents,...

This paper shows how market entry into an unprofitable market can be profitable for a firm. A firm's expansion into a new market can have a beneficial feedback effect for that firm in its “old market”. By entering into a new market, the firm increases its produced quantity and has higher...

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility...

Abstract: We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and...