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  • Search: subject:"Strategy Set Growth"
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Year of publication
Subject
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bounded rationality 2 nonstationary bounded recall 2 repeated games 2 strategic complexity 2 strategy set growth 2 Beschränkte Rationalität 1 Bounded Rationality 1 Entropie 1 Entropy 1 Nonstationary Bounded Recall 1 Repeated Games 1 Soziale Beziehungen 1 Strategic Complexity 1 Strategy Set Growth 1 Theorie 1 Wiederholte Spiele 1 Zeit 1 entropy 1
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Online availability
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Free 2
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 1
Language
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Undetermined 2 English 1
Author
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Okada, Daijiro 3 Neyman, Abraham 2 Null, Abraham Neyman 1
Institution
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Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1 Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick 1
Published in...
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Departmental Working Papers / Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick 1 Discussion Paper Series / Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 1 Working Paper 1
Source
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RePEc 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall
Neyman, Abraham; Okada, Daijiro - 2005
This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266360
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Cover Image
Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Neyman, Abraham; Okada, Daijiro - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2005
One way to express bounded rationality of a player in a game theoretic models is by specifying a set of feasible strategies for that player. In dynamic game models with finite automata and bounded recall strategies, for example, feasibility of strategies is determined via certain complexity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005459381
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Cover Image
Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy and Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Null, Abraham Neyman; Okada, Daijiro - Department of Economics, Rutgers University-New Brunswick - 2005
This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005626671
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