Search Results - subject:"Strict core"

Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems

Feng, Di; Klaus, Bettina - In: International journal of economic theory 18 (2022) 1, pp. 61-76

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013161977

Core stability and strategy-proofness in hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Özbilen, Seçkin - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014335941

Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple-type housing market problems

Feng, Di; Klaus, Bettina - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012620942

A solution for general exchange markets with indivisible goods when indifferences are allowed

Subiza Martínez, Begoña; Peris, Josep E. - In: Mathematical economics letters 2 (2014) 3/4, pp. 77-81

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010496343

Conflict leads to cooperation in demand bargaining

Rozen, Kareen - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 87 (2013), pp. 35-42

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009732809

A Solution for General Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods when Indifferences Are Allowed

Subiza, Begoña; Peris, Josep - Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría … - 2013

contain Pareto inecient allocations. The strict core solves this shortcoming when indiff erences are not allowed, but when … agents' preferences are weak orders the strict core may be empty. On the other hand, when indifferences are allowed, the core … or the strict core may fail to be stable sets, in the von Neumann and Morgenstern sense. We introduce a new solution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010991673

Dynamics, Stability, and Foresight in the Shapley-Scarf Housing Market

Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2009

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008033

Dynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market

Kamijo, Yoshio; Kawasaki, Ryo - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279626

Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets

Fujinaka, Yuji; Wakayama, Takuma - 2009

This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332437

A Solution for General Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods when Indifferences are Allowed

Begoña, Subiza; Peris Josep E. - In: Mathematical Economics Letters 2 (2014) 3-4, pp. 5-5

contain Pareto inefficient allocations. The strict core solves this shortcoming when indifferences are not allowed, but when … agents' preferences are weak orders the strict core may be empty. On the other hand, when indifferences are allowed, the core … or the strict core may fail to be stable sets, in the von Neumann and Morgenstern sense. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084821