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  • Search: subject:"Student-optimal vNM stable matching"
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Subject
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Efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm 2 Strictly strong Nash equilibrium 2 Student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm 2 Student-optimal vNM stable matching 2 Algorithm 1 Algorithmus 1 Game theory 1 Matching 1 Nash equilibrium 1 Nash-Gleichgewicht 1 Spieltheorie 1
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Article 2
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Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 1 Undetermined 1
Author
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Bando, Keisuke 2
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Games and Economic Behavior 1 Games and economic behavior 1
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
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On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
Bando, Keisuke - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 269-287
This study analyzes a preference revelation game in the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm in a college admission problem. We assume that each college's true preferences are known publicly, and analyze the strategic behavior of students. We demonstrate the existence of a strictly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931189
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Cover Image
On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
Bando, Keisuke - In: Games and economic behavior 87 (2014), pp. 269-287
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304950
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