We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and...

We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and...

We study the information flows that arise among a set of agents with local knowledge and directed payoff interactions, which differ among pairs of agents. First, we study the equilibrium of a game where, before making decisions, agents can invest in pairwise active communication (speaking) and...

In my critical review of Arrow's theory of information, I show that despite its great achievements, this theory lacks the tacit, institutionalized, unexpected and non-rational dimensions of knowledge. The organizational or corporate culture cannot be derived from market failure or market...

Problems faced by human groups according with Organization Theory can be summarized as the search for an equilibrium between the transmission of the information necessary in order for teams to raise their efficiency, and the increase in costs that this entails. The fact that one of the proposed...