//--> //--> //-->
Toggle navigation
Logout
Change account settings
EN
DE
ES
FR
A-Z
Beta
About EconBiz
News
Thesaurus (STW)
Academic Skills
Help
EN
DE
ES
FR
My account
Logout
Change account settings
Login
Publications
Events
Your search terms
Search
Search options
All Fields
Title
Exact title
Subject
Author
Institution
ISBN/ISSN
Published in...
Publisher
Open Access only
Advanced
Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites
Loans
Reservations
Fines
You are here:
Home
Search: subject:"Ternary voting games"
Narrow search
Narrow search
Year of publication
From:
To:
Subject
All
Cooperative games
2
Ordinal equivalence
2
Ternary voting games
2
limit theorems
2
ternary voting games
2
voting power
2
weighted voting games
2
Abstimmungsregel
1
Abstimmungsspiel
1
C 71
1
Cooperative game
1
Game theory
1
Hierarchies
1
Kooperatives Spiel
1
Postulates of power measures
1
Shapley value
1
Shapley-Shubik index
1
Shapley-Wert
1
Spieltheorie
1
Voting behaviour
1
Voting game
1
Voting rule
1
Wahlverhalten
1
more ...
less ...
Online availability
All
Undetermined
3
Free
1
Type of publication
All
Article
3
Book / Working Paper
1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Article in journal
1
Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
1
Language
All
Undetermined
3
English
1
Author
All
Parker, Cameron
2
Friedman, Jane
1
LINDNER, Ines
1
Lindner, Ines
1
Institution
All
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
1
Published in...
All
CORE Discussion Papers
1
Games and Economic Behavior
1
Games and economic behavior
1
Theory and Decision
1
Source
All
RePEc
3
ECONIS (ZBW)
1
Showing
1
-
4
of
4
Sort
relevance
articles prioritized
date (newest first)
date (oldest first)
1
The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for
ternary
voting
games
Friedman, Jane
;
Parker, Cameron
- In:
Games and economic behavior
108
(
2018
),
pp. 379-390
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011982838
Saved in:
2
Voting games with abstention : A probabilistic characterization of power and a special case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem
LINDNER, Ines
-
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), …
-
2005
voter can choose between two options: 'yes' or 'no'. Felsenthal and Machover (1997) introduced the concept of
ternary
voting
…
games
(TVGs) which recognizes abstention alongside. They derive appropriate generalizations of the Shapley-Shubik and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043436
Saved in:
3
The influence relation for
ternary
voting
games
Parker, Cameron
- In:
Games and Economic Behavior
75
(
2012
)
2
,
pp. 867-881
true for all
Ternary
Voting
Games
. Also we will show that adding a third voting option allows for asymmetric distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577251
Saved in:
4
A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed
Lindner, Ines
- In:
Theory and Decision
64
(
2008
)
4
,
pp. 495-518
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068009
Saved in:
Results per page
10
25
50
100
250
A service of the
zbw
×
Loading...
//-->