When the government issues long-term bonds, the optimal time-consistent fiscal and monetary policy is to consolidate debt in a liquidity trap by increasing taxes and by taming public spending. This prescription is at odds with large deficit-spending undertaken in the US during previous liquidity...

When the government issues long-term bonds, the optimal time-consistent fiscal and monetary policy is to consolidate debt in a liquidity trap by increasing taxes and by taming public spending. This prescription is at odds with large deficit-spending undertaken in the US during previous liquidity...

The recent literature has emphasized that government intervention when consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences ('bias for the present') over consumption is not welfare-enhancing. This paper introduces a market imperfection (which takes the form of a negative externality) and shows that...

The recent literature has emphasized that government intervention when consumers have quasi-hyperbolic preferences ('bias for the present') over consumption is not welfare-enhancing. This paper introduces a market imperfection (which takes the form of a negative externality) and shows that...

We build an infinite horizon equilibrium model of fiscal federation, where anticipation of transfers from the central government creates incentives for local governments to overborrow. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers, which distorts the central-local distribution of...

We build an infinite horizon equilibrium model of fiscal federation, where anticipation of transfers from the central government creates incentives for local governments to overborrow. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers, which distorts the central-local distribution of...