We present an equilibrium search model of competing mechanisms where some buyers are budget constrained. Absent budget constraints, the existing literature capitulates that if buyers differ in their valuations then in the unique equilibrium all sellers hold second price auctions (e.g. McAfee...

The paper presents a survey of theoretical and applied literature on internet auctions. On-line auctions represents an example of how new and flexible exchange procedures can be designed and offered to users of the net. New auction rules designed for internet auctions stimulated new theoretical...

Electronic version of an article published as Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, Volume 10, Issue 4, 2007, pp. 519-540, Article DOI: 10.1142/S0219091507001185 Copyright World Scientific Publishing Company www.worldscinet.com/rpbfmp

We study a market where identical capacity-constrained sellers compete to attract identical buyers, via price advertisements. Once buyers reach a store, prices might be renegotiable in a manner that is responsive to excess demand. We focus strongly symmetric equilibria, proving their existence...