This paper uses replicator dynamics to compare the steady states arising from two types of common property regimes - one in which over-exploiters are punished by the resource users themselves, and another where enforcement is handled by guards who collect a tax from the users. The use of guards...

In the intertemporal common-pool resource game, non-cooperative behavior produces externalities reducing subjects' payoffs in both the present and the future. In this paper, we investigate through two experiments whether binding contracts, non-binding promises and social feedback help to promote...

Naturwissenschaftliche Fragen rund um den Klimawandel sind von Naturwissenschaftlern zu beantworten. Ökonomen und Wirtschaftsethiker können jedoch dazu beitragen, den Klimawandel und mögliche Gegenmaßnahmen zu bewerten. Dabei ist ein einheitlicher Preis für die Emission von Treibhausgasen...