This paper examines how translating school assignment information into parents' native languages affects school choice outcomes in Bremen, a city state in Germany, where a strategyincentivizing immediate acceptance mechanism is used. While translated information was made available to...

This paper examines how translating school assignment information into parents' native languages affects school choice outcomes in Bremen, a city state in Germany, where a strategyincentivizing immediate acceptance mechanism is used. While translated information was made available to...

Manipulability is a threat to the successful design of centralized matching markets. However, in many applications some manipulation is inevitable and the designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms. We count the number of agents with an incentive to manipulate and rank mechanisms by their...

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when firms' preference profile satisfies a...

This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that a stable matching exists in a discrete matching market when the firms' preference profile satisfies...