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  • Search: subject:"Type-dependent participation"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Bureaucracy 6 Delegation 6 Environmental Policy 6 Mechanism Design 6 Political Economy 6 Pure State Constraints in Optimal Control 6 Regulatory Agency 6 Type-dependent Participation Constraint 6 Agency theory 5 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 5 Asymmetric information 4 type-dependent participation constraints 4 Adverse Selektion 3 Adverse selection 3 Asymmetrische Information 3 Optimal control 3 Umweltpolitik 3 convex analysis 3 Aufsichtsbehörde 2 Bürokratie 2 Bürokratietheorie 2 Dynamic mechanism design 2 Environmental policy 2 Environmental standard 2 Limited commitment 2 Mathematical programming 2 Mathematische Optimierung 2 Neue politische Ökonomie 2 Public choice 2 Regulation 2 Regulatory agency 2 Regulierung 2 Sequential screening 2 Theorie 2 Theory of bureaucracy 2 Type-dependent participation 2 Umweltstandard 2 nonsmooth optimization 2 Bargaining theory 1 Contract theory 1
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Online availability
All
Free 10 Undetermined 2 CC license 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 10 Article 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 6 Arbeitspapier 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3 Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Article 1
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Language
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English 9 Undetermined 4
Author
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Lingens, Jörg 6 Voß, Achim 6 Martimort, David 3 Stole, Lars A. 3 Deb, Rahul 2 Said, Maher 2 Sundararajan, Arun 1 Vislie, Jon 1
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Institution
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Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 1 EconWPA 1 Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 University of Toronto, Department of Economics 1
Published in...
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CAWM Discussion Paper 1 CAWM Discussion Papers 1 CAWM discussion paper 1 Discussion papers / CEPR 1 Journal of economic theory 1 Law and Economics 1 Memorandum 1 Nota di Lavoro 1 Theoretical Economics 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1 Working Papers / Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 1 Working Papers / University of Toronto, Department of Economics 1 Working paper 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 5 EconStor 4 RePEc 4
Showing 1 - 10 of 13
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Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - In: Theoretical Economics 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1145-1181
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semi-continuous in the control variable. We apply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536915
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Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1145-1181
We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327119
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Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A. - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012301068
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What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335858
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What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398420
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What’s the Damage? Environmental Regulation with Policy-Motivated Bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government’s choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010813781
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What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, … - 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010984546
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What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014 - This Version: January 31, 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338152
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Cover Image
What's the damage? : environmental regulation with policy-motivated bureaucrats
Voß, Achim; Lingens, Jörg - 2014
Many environmental-policy problems are characterized by complexity and uncertainty. Government's choice concerning these policies commonly relies on information provided by a bureaucracy. Environmental bureaucrats often have a political motivation of their own, so they might be tempted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010380647
Saved in:
Cover Image
Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment
Deb, Rahul; Said, Maher - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013
We examine a model of dynamic screening and price discrimination in which the seller has limited commitment power. Two cohorts of anonymous, patient, and risk-neutral buyers arrive over two periods. Buyers in the first cohort arrive in period one, are privately informed about the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897046
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