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  • Search: subject:"Verifiable messages"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Communication 4 Kommunikation 4 communication 4 experiment 4 partially verifiable messages 4 verification control 4 Experiment 3 Incomplete information 3 Theorie 3 Theory 3 Unvollkommene Information 3 Asymmetric information 2 Asymmetrische Information 2 Bayesian persuasion 2 Economics of information 2 Game theory 2 Information dissemination 2 Informationsverbreitung 2 Informationsökonomik 2 Signalling 2 Spieltheorie 2 verifiable messages 2 Auskunftspflicht 1 Berichtswesen 1 Commitment 1 Corporate disclosure 1 Disclosure regulation 1 Discretionary disclosure 1 Information 1 Information value 1 Informationswert 1 Mandatory disclosure 1 Partially verifiable messages 1 Product quality 1 Produktqualität 1 Public relations 1 Reporting 1 Unternehmenspublizität 1 Verifiable messages 1 Verification control 1
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Online availability
All
Free 4 Undetermined 4
Type of publication
All
Article 4 Book / Working Paper 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 4 Article in journal 3 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 3 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
Language
All
English 7 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Burdea, Valeria 5 Sefton, Martin 5 Montero, María 3 Michaeli, Beatrice 2 Montero Muñoz, María 2 Friedman, Henry L. 1 Hughes, John S. 1 Lanzi, Thomas 1 Mathis, Jerome 1
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Published in...
All
CEDEX discussion paper series 2 CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2 Games and economic behavior 1 Journal of accounting & economics 1 The accounting review : a publication of the American Accounting Association 1 Theory and Decision 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 5 EconStor 2 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 8 of 8
Cover Image
Communication with partially verifiable information : an experiment
Burdea, Valeria; Montero, María; Sefton, Martin - In: Games and economic behavior 142 (2023), pp. 113-149
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469295
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Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment
Burdea, Valeria; Montero Muñoz, María; Sefton, Martin - 2020
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012389700
Saved in:
Cover Image
Communication with partially verifiable information : an experiment
Burdea, Valeria; Montero, María; Sefton, Martin - 2020
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012239483
Saved in:
Cover Image
Communication with partially verifiable information: An experiment
Burdea, Valeria; Montero Muñoz, María; Sefton, Martin - 2018
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029785
Saved in:
Cover Image
Communication with partially verifiable information : an experiment
Burdea, Valeria; Montero, María; Sefton, Martin - 2018
We use laboratory experiments to study communication games with partially verifiable information. In these games, based on Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006), an informed sender sends a two-dimensional message to a receiver, but only one dimension of the message can be verified. We compare a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011897228
Saved in:
Cover Image
Optimal reporting when additional information might arrive
Friedman, Henry L.; Hughes, John S.; Michaeli, Beatrice - In: Journal of accounting & economics 69 (2020) 2/3, pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237570
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Cover Image
Divide and inform : rationing information to facilitate persuasion
Michaeli, Beatrice - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 92 (2017) 5, pp. 167-199
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762783
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Consulting an Expert with Potentially Conflicting Preferences
Lanzi, Thomas; Mathis, Jerome - In: Theory and Decision 65 (2008) 3, pp. 185-204
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005710949
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