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  • Search: subject:"Verifiable regulatory mechanisms"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Polluting monopolist 2 Surplus subsidy schemes 2 Verifiable regulatory mechanisms 2 polluting monopolist 2 surplus subsidy schemes 2 verifiable regulatory mechanisms 2 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Environmental policy 1 Game theory 1 Monopol 1 Monopoly 1 Pollution 1 Regulation 1 Regulierung 1 Spieltheorie 1 Subsidy 1 Subvention 1 Umweltbelastung 1 Umweltpolitik 1
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Online availability
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Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 2 Book / Working Paper 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
All
English 2 Undetermined 2
Author
All
Prieger, James E. 3 Sanders, Nicholas J. 3 Hanushek, Eric A. 1 Woessmann, Ludger 1 Zhang, Lei 1
Institution
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Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University 2
Published in...
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Discussion Papers / Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University 2 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1 Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 1
Source
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RePEc 3 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
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Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist
Prieger, James E.; Sanders, Nicholas J. - In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64 (2012) 3, pp. 410-426
Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594338
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Cover Image
Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist
Prieger, James E.; Sanders, Nicholas J. - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 64 (2012) 3, pp. 410-426
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009699821
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Cover Image
General Education, Vocational Education, and Labor-Market Outcomes over the Life-Cycle
Hanushek, Eric A.; Woessmann, Ludger; Zhang, Lei - Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research … - 2011
Policy debates about the balance of vocational and general education programs focus on the school-to-work transition. But with rapid technological change, gains in youth employment from vocational education may be offset by less adaptability and thus diminished employment later in life. To test...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878013
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Cover Image
Verifiable and Non-Verifiable Anonymous Mechanisms for Regulating a Polluting Monopolist
Prieger, James E.; Sanders, Nicholas J. - Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research … - 2011
Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both external damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes require knowledge of the underlying cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278102
Saved in:
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