Search Results - subject:"Virtual valuation"

Ewerhart, Christian - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2009

Some of the most beautiful results in mechanism design depend crucially on Myerson?s (1981) regularity condition. E.g., the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main results. First, an interpretation of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988914

Optimal dynamic auctions

Pai, Mallesh; Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2008

We consider a dynamic auction problem motivated by the traditional single-leg, multi-period revenue management problem. A seller with C units to sell faces potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of T time periods. The time at which a buyer arrives, her value for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276989

Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information

Tröger, Thomas; Mylovanov, Tymofiy - University of Bonn, Germany - 2008

We consider the problem of mechanism design by a principal who has private information. We point out a simple condition under which the privacy of the principal's information is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism implemented by the principal coincides with the mechanism that would be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968418

Optimal Dynamic Auctions

Pai, Mallesh; Vohra, Rakesh - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

, optimal auctions, virtual valuation, reve- lation principle JEL classification numbers: D44, C72, C73 1 Introduction The … bid in Itt which has a higher (virtual) valuation and a later exit time, intuitively making Itt a ‘better’ inventory of …-7). The allocation scheme proceeds as follows: the valuation of each type is replaced with a ‘virtual valuation’, deflned …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252401

A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - 2006

Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions '€" Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance '€" on the bidders' value distribution profile. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333770

A Characterization of the Conditions for Optimal Auction with Resale

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zhengâ€™s construction requires novel conditions â€” Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance â€” on the biddersâ€™ value...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785817

A characterization of the conditions for optimal auction with resale

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - 2006

Zheng has proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independent-privatevalue environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions - Resale Monotonicity, Transitivity, and Invariance - on the bidders' value distribution profile. The only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366527

A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - 2005

Zheng has recently proposed a seller-optimal auction for (asymmetric) independentprivate- value environments where inter-bidder resale is possible. Zheng's construction requires novel conditions on the bidders' value distribution profile. We clarify the restrictions implied by these conditions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263151

A note on Zheng’s conditions for implementing an optimal auction with resale

Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Tröger, Thomas - University of Bonn, Germany - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005028507