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  • Search: subject:"Voting mechanisms"
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Year of publication
Subject
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mechanism design 4 public-good provision 4 voting mechanisms 4 Wahlverhalten 3 Abstimmungsregel 2 Large Economy 2 Mechanism Design 2 Mechanism design 2 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 2 Neue politische Ökonomie 2 Public choice 2 Public goods 2 Public-good provision 2 Voting Mechanisms 2 Voting behaviour 2 Voting rule 2 immunity against robustly blocking coalitions 2 large economy 2 robust incentive compatibility 2 Öffentliche Güter 2 Allocation 1 Allokation 1 Coalition 1 Coalitional Voting Mechanisms 1 Core Convergence 1 Information Transmission 1 Koalition 1 Mechanism Design 1 Mediation 1 Rational Expectations Equilibrium 1 Theorie 1 Versorgung 1 Öffentliches Gut 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 7
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 6 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
Language
All
English 6 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Bierbrauer, Felix 6 Hellwig, Martin 6 Kamishiro, Yusuke 1 Serrano, Roberto 1
Institution
All
Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft 1
Published in...
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Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 5 Working Paper 1 Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 1
Source
All
EconStor 4 ECONIS (ZBW) 2 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
Cover Image
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
the use of voting mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348184
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Cover Image
Public-good provision in large economies: Robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
blocking thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348188
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Cover Image
Public-good provision, mechanism design and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
the use of voting mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011305201
Saved in:
Cover Image
Public-good provision in large economies : robust incentive compatibility, immunity to robustly blocking coalitions, and voting
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2015
blocking thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334017
Saved in:
Cover Image
Mechanism design and voting for public-good provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - 2011
coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286687
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Cover Image
Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Hellwig, Martin - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2011
coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535928
Saved in:
Cover Image
Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies
Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2008
We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284034
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