An operational macroprudential approach to financial stability requires tools that attribute system-wide risk to individual institutions. Making use of constructs from game theory, we propose an attribution methodology that has a number of appealing features: it can be used in conjunction with...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since thenseveral axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed tocost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this...

We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipelinenetwork determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If theassessment is narrowly focussed on the abilities to obstruct °ows in the existingsystem, the main transit countries Belarus and Ukraine...