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  • Search: subject:"Weighted hierarchical outcome"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Cycle-free graph game 3 Hierarchical outcome 3 Implementation 3 Kooperatives Spiel 3 Weighted hierarchical outcome 3 Average Tree solution 2 Cooperative game 2 Graphentheorie 2 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 2 average tree solution 2 cycle-free graph game 2 hierarchical outcome 2 implementation 2 tree game 2 weighted hierarchical outcome 2 Average tree solution 1 Communication 1 Gerechtigkeit 1 Graph theory 1 Justice 1 Kommunikation 1 Noncooperative game 1 Shapley value 1 Shapley-Wert 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Transferable utility 1 Transferierbarer Nutzen 1 Tree game 1
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Online availability
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Free 3 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3 Article 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 3 Undetermined 2
Author
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Moes, Nigel 5 Laan, Gerard van der 3 Brink, René van den 2 van der Laan, Gerard 2 Brink, Rene van den 1 van den Brink, Rene 1 van den Brink, René 1
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Institution
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Tinbergen Instituut 1
Published in...
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Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 1 Journal of Economic Theory 1 Journal of economic theory 1 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 1 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 2 RePEc 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
Cover Image
A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
van den Brink, Rene; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - 2012
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326336
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Cover Image
A Strategic Implementation of the Average Tree Solution for Cycle-Free Graph Games
Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012
This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Economic Theory', 2014, 148, 2737-2748.<P> In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the average tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257390
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Cover Image
A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009722639
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Cover Image
A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games
van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard; Moes, Nigel - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2737-2748
In this note we provide a strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for zero-monotonic cycle-free graph games. That is, we propose a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the average hierarchical outcome of the game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719008
Saved in:
Cover Image
A strategic implementation of the Average Tree solution for cycle-free graph games
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 6, pp. 2737-2748
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257894
Saved in:
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