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  • Search: subject:"Weighted voting"
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Year of publication
Subject
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weighted voting 17 Abstimmungsregel 9 Voting 8 weighted voting games 8 Abstimmung 7 Voting rule 7 Spieltheorie 6 voting power 6 EU-Staaten 5 Theorie 5 Wahlverhalten 5 legislative bargaining 5 European Union 4 Game theory 4 Voting behaviour 4 Weighted voting 4 simple games 4 Abstimmungsspiel 3 Banzhaf index 3 EU countries 3 EU enlargement 3 Kooperatives Spiel 3 Macht 3 Majority rule 3 Neue politische Ökonomie 3 Power 3 Public choice 3 Theory 3 Voting game 3 collective choice 3 dummy player 3 paradox of new members 3 power measures 3 simple voting games 3 Cooperative game 2 EU Enlargement 2 EU-Politik 2 Gruppenentscheidung 2 Majoritarian Bargaining 2 Nichtkooperatives Spiel 2
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Online availability
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Free 34 CC license 2
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 26 Article 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 8 Article 4 Graue Literatur 4 Non-commercial literature 4 Article in journal 3 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 3 Arbeitspapier 2 Hochschulschrift 2 Conference Paper 1 Thesis 1
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Language
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English 24 Undetermined 9 Hungarian 1
Author
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Mayer, Alexander 7 Montero, Maria 6 Napel, Stefan 6 Jackson, Matthew O. 3 Kurz, Sascha 3 Barbera, Salvador 2 Filipp, Jan 2 LINDNER, Ines 2 Staudacher, Jochen 2 Wagner, Felix 2 Barberà, Salvador 1 Barthelemy, Fabrice 1 Chang, Pao-Li 1 Chua, Vincent C H 1 Chua, Vincent CH 1 Doležel, Pavel 1 Esposito, Gabriele 1 Guerci, Eric 1 Hanaki, Nobuyuki 1 Holler, Manfred J. 1 Houy, Nicolas 1 Klos, Klos, T.B. 1 Kóczy, László Á. 1 Lepelley, Dominique 1 Lu, Xiaoyan 1 Machover, Moshe 1 Martin, Mathieu 1 Montero, María 1 Passerelli, Francesco 1 Pintér, Péter Miklós 1 Schure, Paul 1 Scoones, David 1 Ueng, C H 1 Watanabe, Naoki 1 Wegner, Wenke 1 Zhang, Zhang, Y. 1 Zwicker, William S. 1 de Keijzer, de Keijzer, B. 1 市川, 実 1
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Institution
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Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain 2 Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics 2 Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2 HAL 2 School of Economics, Singapore Management University 2 Department of Economics, University of Victoria 1 Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam 1 Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 1 Théorie Économique, Modélisation, Application (THEMA), Université de Cergy-Pontoise 1
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Published in...
All
Games 6 CORE Discussion Papers 2 CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2 Discussion Papers / Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), School of Economics 2 Nota di Lavoro 2 Working Papers / Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2 Working Papers / HAL 2 Working Papers / School of Economics, Singapore Management University 2 Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2018: Digitale Wirtschaft - Session: Voting II 1 CEDEX discussion paper series 1 Czech Economic Review 1 Department Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, University of Victoria 1 Discussion Papers / Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University 1 ERIM Report Series Research in Management 1 Economics of Governance 1 IEHAS Discussion Papers 1 Jena Economic Research Papers 1 THEMA Working Papers 1 Working paper 1
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Source
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RePEc 15 EconStor 11 ECONIS (ZBW) 8
Showing 1 - 10 of 34
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Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions
Staudacher, Jochen; Wagner, Felix; Filipp, Jan - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-17
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of …-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for weighted voting games, we present a framework for fast …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200163
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Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions
Staudacher, Jochen; Wagner, Felix; Filipp, Jan - In: Games 13 (2022) 1, pp. 1-17
We study the efficient computation of power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions amongst subsets of …-of-the-art algorithms for computing the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices for weighted voting games, we present a framework for fast …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171847
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Cover Image
Weighted scoring committees
Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200156
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Cover Image
Weighted scoring committees
Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17
Weighted committees allow shareholders, party leaders, etc. to wield different numbers of votes or voting weights as they decide between multiple candidates by a given social choice method. We consider committees that apply scoring methods such as plurality, Borda, or antiplurality rule. Many...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698221
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Weighted voting on the IMF Managing Director
Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - In: Economics of Governance 21 (2020) 3, pp. 237-244
Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund elect the Fund’s Managing Director from a shortlist of three candidates; financial quotas of IMF members define the respective numbers of votes. The implied a priori distribution of success (preference satisfaction) is compared across...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014504450
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Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: Null player or not?
Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2, pp. 1-12
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as 'null players'. Luxembourg's role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper contrasts the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852745
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Weighted Committee Games
Kurz, Sascha; Mayer, Alexander; Napel, Stefan - 2018
environments are then conventionally modeled as weighted voting games. We introduce weighted committee games in order to describe …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011892066
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Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC : null player or not?
Mayer, Alexander - In: Games 9 (2018) 2/29, pp. 1-12
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg’s role in the Council of Ministers during the first period of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011849529
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A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index
Kurz, Sascha - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012183042
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Essays on voting power
Mayer, Alexander - 2018
weighted voting games model binary decision environments. The chapter compares different voting weight configurations for … priori. It extends established methods for quantifying influence from weighted voting on binary options to several voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012183700
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