Search Results - subject:"Weighted voting games"

Consistent allocation of cabinet seats: the Swiss Magic Formula

Wolff, Reiner; Karagök, Yavuz - In: Public Choice 150 (2012) 3, pp. 547-559

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401799

LS Penrose’s limit theorem: Tests by simulation

Chang, Pao-Li; Chua, Vincent CH; Machover, Moshe - School of Economics, Singapore Management University - 2004

– says that, in simple weighted voting games, if the number of voters increases indefinitely while existing voters retain … conjecture that the theorem holds, under rather general conditions, for large classes of weighted voting games, various values of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005004019

On Measuring Influence in Non-Binary Voting Games

Chua, Vincent C H; Ueng, C H - School of Economics, Singapore Management University - 2004

In this note, we demonstrate using two simple examples that generalization of the Banzhaf measure of voter influence to non-binary voting games that requires as starting position a voter’s membership in a winning coalition is likely to incompletely reflect the influence a voter has on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005091177

The simplified modified nucleolus of a cooperative TU-game

Tarashnina, Svetlana - In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of … 19 (2011) 1, pp. 150-166

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009324627

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

Lindner, Ines - In: Economic Theory 35 (2008) 3, pp. 607-611

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370936

A Special Case of Penrose’s Limit Theorem When Abstention is Allowed

Lindner, Ines - In: Theory and Decision 64 (2008) 4, pp. 495-518

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068009