Search Results - subject:"Winner's curse"

Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

Crawford, Vincent P.; Iriberri, Nagore - Department of Economics, University of California-San … - 2005

This paper proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in first- and second-price auctions with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011130676

Discriminatory auctions with seller discretion: evidence from German treasury auctions

Rocholl, Jörg - Deutsche Bundesbank - 2005

This paper examines the results of 93 discriminatory German Treasury auctions between 1998 and 2002. It documents the seller's use of discretion and its influence on auction outcomes and bidding strategies. The evidence suggests that the seller uses its discretion frequently and substantially....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005083089

Who benefits from IPO underpricing? Evidence form hybrid bookbuilding offerings

Pons-Sanz, Vicente - European Central Bank - 2005

This paper uses a unique sample of 175 Spanish equity offerings from 1985 to 2002 to test who benefits from IPO underpricing and why. Institutions receive nearly 75% of the profits in underpriced issues, while they have to bear only 56% of the losses in overpriced offerings. Superior information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005222335

Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions

Boone, Jan; Goeree, Jacob K. - 2005

winner's curse in standard auctions with devastating consequences for revenues. We show that the optimal mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063850

Comparison of two parameterizations of the winner's curse model in a sample of Swedish Treasury auctions

Wang, Xue - In: International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 20 (2012) 2, pp. 100-113

/methodology/approach – The paper compares two winner's curse models using a dataset on multi‐unit auctions. The dataset is from Swedish Treasury …‐shading using both single‐unit model of Wilson and multi‐unit model of Goldreich, and indicates that winner's curse or champion …‐unit model. Research limitations/implications – The evidence implies that bidders rationally adjust their bids due to the winner …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014759175

Comparison of two parameterizations of the winner's curse model in a sample of Swedish Treasury auctions

Wang, Xue - In: International Journal of Accounting and Information … 20 (2012), pp. 100-113

/methodology/approach – The paper compares two winner's curse models using a dataset on multi-unit auctions. The dataset is from Swedish Treasury …-shading using both single-unit model of Wilson and multi-unit model of Goldreich, and indicates that winner's curse or champion …-unit model. Research limitations/implications – The evidence implies that bidders rationally adjust their bids due to the winner …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610611

Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

Haile, Philip A.; Hong, Han; Shum, Matthew - 2004

only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325023

Bad Loans and Entry into Local Credit Markets

Bofondi, Marcello; Gobbi, Giorgio - Banca d'Italia - 2004

Is deregulation sufficient to grant free entry in local credit markets? Economic theory suggests at least two ways in which asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can work as an endogenous barrier to entry. First, entrantsï¿½ pool of applicants contains a larger share of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005113666

Nonparametric tests for common values in first-price sealed-bid auctions

Haile, Philip A.; Hong, Han; Shum, Matthew - 2004

only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner's curse arises only in common values …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607262

Nonparametric Tests for Common Values in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions

Haile, Philip A.; Hong, Han; Shum, Matthew - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2003

observations only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762657