We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through … access provision with an access charge higher than access cost occurs in equilibrium, irrespective of the degree of spillover … investment cost is low. We also show that, when voluntary access provision occurs in equilibrium, access regulation is socially …

We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through … access provision with an access charge higher than access cost occurs in equilibrium, irrespective of the degree of spillover … investment cost is low. We also show that, when voluntary access provision occurs in equilibrium, access regulation is socially …

We examine a game of competition with access provision in which service quality is endogenously determined through … access provision with an access charge higher than access cost occurs in equilibrium, irrespective of the degree of spillover … investment cost is low. We also show that, when voluntary access provision occurs in equilibrium, access regulation is socially …