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  • Search: subject:"aggregation rules"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Neue politische Ökonomie 6 Public choice 6 Abstimmungsregel 5 Aggregation rules 5 Strategy-proofness 5 Voting rule 5 consensus 5 invariance to rule selection 5 preference aggregation rules 5 scoring rules 5 simple majority 5 unanimity 5 Aggregation Rules 4 Theorie 4 Theory 4 social choice 4 transitivity 4 Committee Selection 3 Conflict Management 3 Formula One 3 Group decision-making 3 Gruppenentscheidung 3 Kemeny Distance 3 Ranking 3 Social Choice 3 Sport 3 aggregation rules 3 Aggregation 2 Arrowian results 2 Condorcet-Paradoxon 2 Consensus theories 2 Impossibility theorem 2 Paradox of voting 2 Präferenztheorie 2 Social choice 2 Social welfare function 2 Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion 2 Theory of preferences 2 Unmöglichkeitstheorem 2 complexity 2
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Online availability
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Free 13 Undetermined 6
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 13 Article 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 6 Arbeitspapier 3 Article in journal 3 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 3 Graue Literatur 3 Non-commercial literature 3
Language
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English 12 Undetermined 8
Author
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Mahajne, Muhammad 5 Volij, Oscar 5 Can, Burak 4 Csóka, Péter 4 Ergin, Emre 4 Krauskopf, Thomas 3 Langen, Martin 3 Nitzan, Shmuel 3 CLARK, TERRY D. 2 GIBILISCO, MICHAEL B. 2 Hudry, Olivier 2 MORDESON, JOHN N. 2 Monjardet, Bernard 2 Nitsan, Shemuʾel 2 Baigent, Nick 1 Bouarara, Hadj Ahmed 1 Eckert, Daniel 1 Hamou, Reda Mohamed 1 Pena, Juan Perote 1 Piggins, Ashley 1 Shore, Barry 1 Vincenzi, Marco 1
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Institution
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CESifo 1 Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 (Panthéon-Sorbonne) 1 Centrum für angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 1 Department of Economics, National University of Ireland 1 Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev 1 HAL 1 Institut für Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 1
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Published in...
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New Mathematics and Natural Computation (NMNC) 2 CAWM Discussion Paper 1 CAWM Discussion Papers 1 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 1 Economic theory 1 GSBE research memoranda 1 IEHAS Discussion Papers 1 International Journal of Information Retrieval Research (IJIRR) 1 International journal of technology management : IJTM 1 Mu̐helytanulmányok / Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet 1 Post-Print / HAL 1 Social choice and welfare 1 Theory and Decision 1 Working Papers / Department of Economics, National University of Ireland 1 Working Papers / Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev 1 Working Papers / Institut für Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 1
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Source
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RePEc 10 ECONIS (ZBW) 6 EconStor 3 Other ZBW resources 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 20
Cover Image
How to choose a fair delegation?
Can, Burak; Csóka, Péter; Ergin, Emre - In: Economic theory 72 (2021) 4, pp. 1339-1373
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012663439
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How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?
Can, Burak; Csóka, Péter; Ergin, Emre - 2017
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules are characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011944910
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Cover Image
How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?
Can, Burak; Csóka, Péter; Ergin, Emre - 2017
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules are characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686370
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How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?
Can, Burak; Csóka, Péter; Ergin, Emre - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011637437
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An application of the theory of collective action to large-scale international science projects : managing the enlargement of the fusion community from 11 to 35 countries
Vincenzi, Marco; Shore, Barry - In: International journal of technology management : IJTM 83 (2020) 4, pp. 228-245
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012533691
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Level r Consensus and Stable Social Choice
Mahajne, Muhammad; Nitzan, Shmuel; Volij, Oscar - 2014
We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398622
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Cover Image
Level r Consensus and Stable Social Choice
Mahajne, Muhammad; Nitzan, Shmuel; Volij, Oscar - CESifo - 2014
We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877963
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Cover Image
Level r consensus and stable social choice
Mahajne, Muhammad; Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Volij, Oscar - 2014
We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010356368
Saved in:
Cover Image
A New Algorithm of Grouping Cockroaches Classifier (GCC) for Textual Plagiarism Detection
Hamou, Reda Mohamed; Bouarara, Hadj Ahmed - In: International Journal of Information Retrieval Research … 6 (2016) 4, pp. 51-73
In the last decade with the new technology, it is important to allow users to access information freely, while at the same time, restrict them from illegal copying and distribution of information. In the age of information technologies plagiarism has become a topical subject in the digital world...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012045547
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The election of a world champion
Langen, Martin; Krauskopf, Thomas - 2010
This paper examines the mechanisms by which a World Champion is chosen in the For-mula One Championship. Furthermore it is analysed whether there is a best method to do this. For this purpose we will discuss the methods used by the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA) since the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307193
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