We propose and axiomatically analyze a class of rational solutions to simple allocation problems where a policy-maker allocates an endowment <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$E$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents described by a characteristic vector c. We propose a class of recursive rules which mimic a decision process where the...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed...

We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived, and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible...

This paper addresses two innovative design alternatives of marine container terminals for efficient ship handling service in the mega-containership era. They serve a mega-ship from two sides at dedicated berths. One of the key issues for higher utilization is how the dedicated berths serve other...

The consideration of external costs is becoming more important in supply network design, as companies are under increasing pressure to reduce the environmental and social impacts of their operations. This paper presents a single time period, single-product mixed integer linear programming...