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  • Search: subject:"almost-public monitoring"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Repeated games 6 almost-public monitoring 6 bounded recall 6 coordination 6 private monitoring 6 Almost-public monitoring 4 Coordination 4 Private monitoring 4 repeated games 3 Belief-free equilibrium 2 Bounded recall 2 Employee performance appraisal 2 Game theory 2 Global game 2 Koordination 2 Leistungsbeurteilung 2 Repeated game 2 Robustness 2 Signalling 2 Spieltheorie 2 Wiederholte Spiele 2 Asymmetric information 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Equilibrium model 1 Gefangenendilemma 1 Gleichgewichtsmodell 1 Incomplete information 1 Prisoner's dilemma 1 Unvollkommene Information 1
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Online availability
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Free 6 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Article 5 Book / Working Paper 5
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 2 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 2 Article 1
Language
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English 7 Undetermined 3
Author
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Morris, Stephen 8 Mailath, George J. 7 Sugaya, Takuo 2 Takahashi, Satoru 2 Mailath, George J 1
Institution
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Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 2 Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 2 Society for Economic Dynamics - SED 1
Published in...
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2 PIER Working Paper Archive 2 Theoretical Economics 2 2005 Meeting Papers 1 Journal of Economic Theory 1 Journal of economic theory 1 Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory 1
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Source
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RePEc 7 ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 10
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Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599373
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Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005730970
Saved in:
Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 311-340
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702996
Saved in:
Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private-monitoring perturbations. We show that with full support of public signals, no perfect public equilibrium is robust if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043043
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Cover Image
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
Sugaya, Takuo; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Journal of economic theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 1891-1928
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195601
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Cover Image
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Morris, Stephen; Mailath, George J - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051332
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Cover Image
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593480
Saved in:
Cover Image
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762684
Saved in:
Cover Image
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public-monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005102089
Saved in:
Cover Image
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
Mailath, George J.; Morris, Stephen - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - 2004
Some private-monitoring games, that is, games with no public histories, can have histories that are almost public. These games are the natural result of perturbing public monitoring games towards private monitoring. We explore the extent to which it is possible to coordinate continuation play in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109597
Saved in:
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