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  • Search: subject:"and Positive Constitutional Economics"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Corruption 2 Judicial Independence and Positive Constitutional Economics 2 Prosecution Agencies 2 corruption 2 judicial independence and positive constitutional economics 2 prosecution agencies 2 Gewaltenteilung 1 Justiz 1 Korruption 1 Kriminalpolitik 1 Welt 1
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Online availability
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Free 4
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2
Language
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English 4
Author
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Feld, Lars P. 4 Voigt, Stefan 4 Aaken, Anne van 2 van Aaken, Anne 2
Institution
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CESifo 1 Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1
Published in...
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CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics 1 MAGKS Papers on Economics 1
Source
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EconStor 2 RePEc 2
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
van Aaken, Anne; Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - 2008
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270593
Saved in:
Cover Image
Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
van Aaken, Anne; Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - 2008
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270598
Saved in:
Cover Image
Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
Aaken, Anne van; Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2008
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005652891
Saved in:
Cover Image
Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator
Aaken, Anne van; Feld, Lars P.; Voigt, Stefan - CESifo - 2008
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181534
Saved in:
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