Search Results - subject:"backward induction equilibrium"

Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information

Xu, Zibo - 2013

stochastically stable. We present a 'centipede-trust game', where we prove that both the backward induction equilibrium component and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381249

Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information

Xu, Zibo - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 2013

stochastically stable. We present a `centipede-trust game', where we prove that both the backward induction equilibrium component and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631448

Stochastic stability in finite extensive-form games of perfect information

Xu, Zibo - 2013

stochastically stable. We present a 'centipede-trust game', where we prove that both the backward induction equilibrium component and … ; backward induction equilibrium ; Nash equilibrium components ; best-reply dynamics …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009727120

Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations

Gorodeisky, Ziv - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2003

induction equilibrium is evolutionarily stable for large populations. … from zero. Here it is shown that one can dispense with this last condition. In particular, it follows that the backward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596251

Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction

Hart, Sergiu - EconWPA - 1999

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407617