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  • Search: subject:"bargaining in legislatures"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Baron/Ferejohn model 4 bargaining in legislatures 4 open rules 4 threegroup and four-group equilibria 3 Spieltheorie 2 Verhandlungstheorie 2 Wahlverhalten 2 Bargaining theory 1 Game theory 1 Voting behaviour 1 three-group and four-group equilibria 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 4
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 3 Undetermined 1
Author
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Fahrenberger, Theresa 4 Gersbach, Hans 4
Institution
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C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1 CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of Management, Technology and Economics (D-MTEC) 1
Published in...
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CEPR Discussion Papers 1 CER-ETH Economics working paper series 1 Economics Working Paper Series 1 Working papers of the Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich 1
Source
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RePEc 2 ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 4 of 4
Cover Image
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans - 2007
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753128
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Cover Image
Legislative process and open rules
Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans - 2007 - This version: February 6, 2007
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003459202
Saved in:
Cover Image
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789056
Saved in:
Cover Image
Legislative Process with Open Rules
Fahrenberger, Theresa; Gersbach, Hans - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2007
We examine the legislative game with open rules proposed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989). We first show that the three-group equilibrium suggested by Baron and Ferejohn does not always obtain. Second, we characterize the set of stationary equilibria for simple and super majority rules. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839144
Saved in:
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