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  • Search: subject:"bargaining rules"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Seniority 2 bargaining rules 2 endogenous agenda 2 incumbency advantage 2 legislative bargaining 2 recognition rule 2 Abstimmungsregel 1 Bargaining theory 1 Dynamic game 1 Dynamisches Spiel 1 Game theory 1 Negotiations 1 Neue politische Ökonomie 1 Public choice 1 Spieltheorie 1 Verhandlungen 1 Verhandlungstheorie 1 Voting rule 1
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Online availability
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Free 2
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1 Working Paper 1
Language
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English 1 Undetermined 1
Author
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Eguia, Jon X. 2 Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2
Institution
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School of Economics, Finance and Management, University of Bristol 1
Published in...
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Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 1 Discussion paper / University of Bristol, Department of Economics 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
Cover Image
Endogenous Assembly Rules, Senior Agenda Power, and Incumbency Advantage
Eguia, Jon X.; Shepsle, Kenneth A. - School of Economics, Finance and Management, University … - 2014
We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776460
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Cover Image
Endogenous assembly rules, senior agenda power, and incumbency advantage
Eguia, Jon X.; Shepsle, Kenneth A. - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362570
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