We study the impact of gender norms on the distribution of paid and unpaid labor between women and men in an intra-household bargaining model featuring endogenous social norms. In contrast to the previous literature, which assumes a homogeneous social norm, agents are connected via explicitly...

We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we...

Bilateral bargaining is often mediated by a third party, called an “intermediary.” In many cases, the intermediary shares some interest with one of the two parties in the negotiation and cannot commit to and enforce his decision. This paper studies the effect of such a “biased”...

We study whether negotiators adopt commitment tactics in bargaining, which was first proposed by Schelling (1956), and their choice of the credibility of commitment. In a modified ultimatum game experiment, the responder can pre-commit to a minimum acceptable offer (MAO) before an offer is...

We report an experiment designed to study one-to-many bargaining behavior and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures complementary items from two heterogeneous sellers...

Members of marketing airline alliance on one hand cooperatively booking seats from the operating airline, and on the other hand compete with each other in the market. Two types of bargaining process including representative based and agent based cooperative bargaining are respectively modeled...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study a decentralized market where players engage in multiple simultaneous trading games. We propose a new class of bargaining protocols that allow players to keep bid amounts shrouded from each other (covert bargaining) and to revise their bids if they wish...

We consider a reputation based bargaining model with uncertainty of players’ initial beliefs, which are generated by an exogenous signaling device.We characterize the set of non-trivial equilibria satisfying initial posture constraints. The analysis yields a unique equilibrium with a phased...

We modify the Acquiring-a-Company game to study lying in ultimatum bargaining. Privately informed sellers send messages about the alleged value of their company to potential buyers. Via random information leaks, buyers can learn the true value before proposing a price which the seller finally...