This article examines the collusive potential of first refusal contracts, which are contracts that grant one party, the buyer, a right of first refusal on the output of another party, the seller. When two parties enter into this type of contract, the seller is obligated to offer any output she...

This paper considers the recently introduced New Zealand Fair Pay Agreement (FPA) sectoral bargaining framework and offers a preliminary series of ideas and proposals setting out how an FPA model for bargaining sectoral standards could work in Canada. It is intended as the beginning of a more...

I analyze a dynamic model of concurrent bargaining in which multiple long-lived prospective buyers compete to trade with a long-lived seller over two periods. The paper investigates how offer confidentiality and buyer participation affect bargaining dynamics within this framework. When buyers’...

I derive a refinement of sequential equilibria of a noncooperative bargaining game when one player has incomplete information about the time preference of the other player. I show that if the types for this latter player are drawn from some totally ordered and finite lattice, Grossman &...

We model mortgage refinancing as a bargaining game involving the borrowing household, the incumbent lender, and an outside bank. In equilibrium, the borrower's ability to refinance depends both on the competitiveness of the local banking market and on the cost of switching banks. We find...

The article explores how citizens may bargain for distribution in strong authoritarian regimes. Combining in-depth case study and the survey experiment approach, it finds that regimes’ pursuit of certain political priorities may enable unlawful bargaining, an increasingly popular form of...

Cooperative game theory addresses two problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. We hypothesize that the existence of the core, which is a fundamental concept in cooperative game theory, affects coalition formation, and we examine this hypothesis through a laboratory experiment. In...

We consider non-cooperative bargaining over a fixed surplus between two groups that may differ in size and the supermajority threshold they employ for within-group ratification. We find that total allocation to a group does not depend on group size and increases with the supermajority threshold....

How people attribute the others’ previous actions often influences their feeling of inequality and then their subsequent responses. In a bilateral ultimatum bargaining game with both inequality aversion and incomplete information, a greedy offer can be attributed to either the proposer’s...

A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the...