In a bargaining paradigm, we investigated the influence of reputational concern and monetary gain on generosity and deception. 141 schoolchildren aged between 7 to 12 participated in an ultimatum bargaining game. As proposers, they were asked to split a monetary resource with a hypothetical...

We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to understand if gradual exogenous revelation of sellers’ private information influences how trades occur in both the competitive market and bilateral bargaining settings where a static lemon condition holds. Our experiments implement the Daley and...

This paper introduces certainty equivalents as an alternative to the expected utility framework that is often used in the bargaining literature. If agents bargain over their certainty equivalents, a higher risk aversion does not necessarily weaken their bargaining position – for the same...

Alternating-offers bargaining procedures generate two types of surplus: (i) shares of the pie that is divided according to the assumed bargaining mechanism, and (ii) surpluses that are generated by the first-mover advantage. Most existing literature focuses on the first surplus but ignores the...

A buyer has unknown valuation for a good; the seller makes all offers and has preferences for fairness; there is an infinite horizon. Without fairness preferences the Coase conjecture obtains, the object is sold almost immediately at a price equal the buyer's lowest valuation offers are frequent....

I study a model of multilateral bargaining in which multiple proposers simultaneously make offers on several pies. I identify a novel source of inefficient delay unique to multilateral bargaining -- free-riding among proposers. I establish that there exist stationary equilibria with delay and...

In many settings where pricing is delegated to salespeople, firms provide the salespeople incentives to not only sell more, but also to do so at higher prices. In this paper, we study the relative importance of pricing-focused and revenue-focused incentives, and quantify the profitability of...

As a member of priori coalition, the motivation for a player to participate in the grand coalition is to get more payoff value, so the scale of the priori coalition needs to be considered in the allocation among the priori coalitions. Considering the size difference of prior coalitions, two...

Cooperative game theory addresses two problems: coalition formation and payoff distribution. To focus on the payoff distribution problem, cooperative game theorists usually assume the formation of the grand coalition, i.e., full cooperation by all individuals when such cooperation generates the...

Bias, disparate treatment, and racism are embedded into the U.S. criminal legal system. A key player within the criminal legal system who could dramatically reduce or eliminate these disparities are prosecutors. Prosecutors enjoy extraordinary power and they exercise that power with few...