We study the optimal long-term care policy when informal care can be provided by children in exchange for monetary transfers by their elderly parents. We consider a bargaining model with single-child families. Daughters have a lower labor market wage and a lower bargaining power within the...

In this paper we provide new estimates of the impact of unions on nonunion wage setting. We allow the presence of unions to affect nonunion wages both through the typically discussed channel of nonunion firms emulating union wages in order to fend off the threat of unionisation and through a...

In this paper, a vertical mixed oligopoly framework is used to select the endogenous competition modes with a two-part tariff input price bargaining. We get the following result: First, the public firm does not have the dominant strategy and the private firm’s strictly dominant strategy is...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether the efficacy of the pledge-and review institution in the bilateral case reported in Lippert & Tremewan (2021) is robust to increased group size. This is a priori unclear, as with more than two players punishment for a low contribution by voting...

In a game with pre-play bilateral communication, messages may trigger moral incentives to honor promises or agreements. We hypothesize that individuals’ inclination to keep a promise is highest if the counterpart requited the promise. We interpret this as an inclination to honor agreements. We...

This paper theoretically and experimentally examines the anchoring effect of focal points in successive negotiations with different bargaining structures. Two variants of the Nash bargaining game that possibly end in conflict are constructed, which strongly incentivize the players to coordinate...

We develop a framework of group corruption via back-door negotiations between an outside initiator and an authority of decision-makers in a hierarchical organization. We examine the role played by the architecture of a multi-tier authority and determine under such a structure how bargaining...

We study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender...