EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"behavioral contract theory"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
Behavioral Contract Theory 23 Renegotiation 23 Incomplete Contracts 16 Verhandlungstheorie 16 behavioral contract theory 16 Contract theory 14 Vertragstheorie 14 Bargaining theory 13 Unvollständiger Vertrag 13 Prospect Theory 12 Theorie 12 Prospect theory 11 Behavioral contract theory 10 Incomplete contract 10 renegotiation 10 Procurement 9 Risikoaversion 9 Theory 9 Employment Contracts 8 Reference Points 8 Auction theory 7 Auktionstheorie 7 Risk aversion 7 Adaptation Costs 6 Auctions 6 Beschaffung 6 Cost efficiency 6 Dauer 6 Kosteneffizienz 6 adaptation costs 6 auctions 6 procurement 6 Behavioral economics 5 Expectation-Based Loss Aversion 5 Loss Aversion 5 Mechanism design 5 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 5 Moral hazard 5 Negotiations 5 Verhaltensökonomik 5
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 33 Undetermined 11
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 41 Article 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 20 Graue Literatur 16 Non-commercial literature 16 Arbeitspapier 11 Article in journal 7 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 7 Konferenzschrift 3 Conference paper 2 Konferenzbeitrag 2 Conference Paper 1 research-article 1
more ... less ...
Language
All
English 35 Undetermined 14
Author
All
Herweg, Fabian 32 Schmidt, Klaus M. 19 Karle, Heiko 9 Müller, Daniel 8 Schmidt, Klaus 4 Göller, Daniel 3 Corgnet, Brice 2 Murooka, Takeshi 2 Rey-Biel, Pedro 2 Yamashita, Takuro 2 Biel, Pedro Rey 1 Cao, Susumu 1 Cato, Susumu 1 Datta, Bikramaditya 1 Ebina, Takeshi 1 Kim, Byung-Cheol 1 Klümper, Andreas 1 Kräkel, Matthias 1 Levental, Shlomo 1 Muller, Daniel 1 Schroder, Mark D. 1 Sinha, Sumit 1 Wakabayashi, Toshiaki 1
more ... less ...
Institution
All
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 5 CESifo 3 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2 School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra 2 Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 1 Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 1 EconWPA 1
more ... less ...
Published in...
All
CESifo Working Paper 3 CESifo Working Paper Series 3 Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 3 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 3 SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 3 CEPR Discussion Papers 2 CESifo working papers 2 Discussion Paper 2 Discussion paper 2 Faculty Working Papers 2 Operations research letters 2 Working papers / TSE : WP 2 Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics 1 Discussion Papers in Economics 1 Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research 1 Economics letters 1 Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 1 Journal of management control 1 MPRA Paper 1 Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences 1 Mathematical finance : an international journal of mathematics, statistics and financial theory 1 Microeconomics 1 Munich Discussion Paper 1 Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge : VWL ; discussion papers 1 Review of Network Economics 1 UFAE and IAE Working Papers 1 Working Papers / Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 1
more ... less ...
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 23 RePEc 15 EconStor 10 Other ZBW resources 1
Showing 1 - 10 of 49
Cover Image
How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion
Göller, Daniel - 2021
A loss-averse buyer and seller face an uncertain environment. Should they write a long-term contract or wait until the state of the world is realized? I show that simple long-term contracts perform better than insinuated in Herweg and Schmidt (2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542214
Saved in:
Cover Image
Optimal trade mechanism with adverse selection and inferential mistakes
Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643273
Saved in:
Cover Image
A note on adverse selection and bounded rationality
Murooka, Takeshi; Yamashita, Takuro - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643274
Saved in:
Cover Image
A theory of management control packages and organizational identity
Wakabayashi, Toshiaki - In: Journal of management control 34 (2023) 4, pp. 463-488
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014502455
Saved in:
Cover Image
How long-term contracts can mitigate inefficient renegotiation arising due to loss aversion
Göller, Daniel - 2020 - [Revidierte Fassung]
A loss-averse buyer and seller face an uncertain environment. Should they write a long-term contract or wait until the state of the world is realized? I show that simple long-term contracts perform better than insinuated in Herweg and Schmidt (2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542436
Saved in:
Cover Image
Monopolistic Screening Under Mental Accounting: Applications to Loan Markets with Collateral
Kim, Byung-Cheol - In: Review of Network Economics 21 (2022) 3, pp. 111-142
Abstract This paper extends the standard model of monopolistic screening to allow for some consumers who engage in narrow framing, a prominent behavioral bias of mental accounting. Narrow framing generates a bias toward high quality-price ratios, which induces even high-type consumers to choose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014618969
Saved in:
Cover Image
Auctions versus negotiations: The effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, a scoring auction implements the efficient allocation. If this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011663451
Saved in:
Cover Image
Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus - 2017
The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011932912
Saved in:
Cover Image
Procurement with unforeseen contingencies
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017 - This version: October 15, 2017
The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762526
Saved in:
Cover Image
Auctions versus negotiations : the effects of inefficient renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017 - This version: January 29, 2017
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation. If the buyer can specify the main characteristics of possible design improvements in a complete contingent contract, a scoring auction implements the efficient allocation. If this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596132
Saved in:
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • Next
  • Last
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...