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  • Search: subject:"behavioral contract theory"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Behavioral Contract Theory 23 Renegotiation 23 Incomplete Contracts 16 Verhandlungstheorie 16 behavioral contract theory 16 Contract theory 14 Vertragstheorie 14 Bargaining theory 13 Unvollständiger Vertrag 13 Prospect Theory 12 Theorie 12 Prospect theory 11 Behavioral contract theory 10 Incomplete contract 10 renegotiation 10 Procurement 9 Risikoaversion 9 Theory 9 Employment Contracts 8 Reference Points 8 Auction theory 7 Auktionstheorie 7 Risk aversion 7 Adaptation Costs 6 Auctions 6 Beschaffung 6 Cost efficiency 6 Dauer 6 Kosteneffizienz 6 adaptation costs 6 auctions 6 procurement 6 Behavioral economics 5 Expectation-Based Loss Aversion 5 Loss Aversion 5 Mechanism design 5 Mechanismus-Design-Theorie 5 Moral hazard 5 Negotiations 5 Verhaltensökonomik 5
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Online availability
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Free 33 Undetermined 11
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 41 Article 8
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 20 Graue Literatur 16 Non-commercial literature 16 Arbeitspapier 11 Article in journal 7 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 7 Konferenzschrift 3 Conference paper 2 Konferenzbeitrag 2 Conference Paper 1 research-article 1
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Language
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English 35 Undetermined 14
Author
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Herweg, Fabian 32 Schmidt, Klaus M. 19 Karle, Heiko 9 Müller, Daniel 8 Schmidt, Klaus 4 Göller, Daniel 3 Corgnet, Brice 2 Murooka, Takeshi 2 Rey-Biel, Pedro 2 Yamashita, Takuro 2 Biel, Pedro Rey 1 Cao, Susumu 1 Cato, Susumu 1 Datta, Bikramaditya 1 Ebina, Takeshi 1 Kim, Byung-Cheol 1 Klümper, Andreas 1 Kräkel, Matthias 1 Levental, Shlomo 1 Muller, Daniel 1 Schroder, Mark D. 1 Sinha, Sumit 1 Wakabayashi, Toshiaki 1
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Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 5 CESifo 3 C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2 School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra 2 Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 1 Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 1 EconWPA 1
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Published in...
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CESifo Working Paper 3 CESifo Working Paper Series 3 Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 3 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 3 SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 3 CEPR Discussion Papers 2 CESifo working papers 2 Discussion Paper 2 Discussion paper 2 Faculty Working Papers 2 Operations research letters 2 Working papers / TSE : WP 2 Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics 1 Discussion Papers in Economics 1 Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research 1 Economics letters 1 Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 1 Journal of management control 1 MPRA Paper 1 Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences 1 Mathematical finance : an international journal of mathematics, statistics and financial theory 1 Microeconomics 1 Munich Discussion Paper 1 Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge : VWL ; discussion papers 1 Review of Network Economics 1 UFAE and IAE Working Papers 1 Working Papers / Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) 1
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Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 23 RePEc 15 EconStor 10 Other ZBW resources 1
Showing 41 - 49 of 49
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Linked recursive preferences and optimality
Levental, Shlomo; Sinha, Sumit; Schroder, Mark D. - In: Mathematical finance : an international journal of … 26 (2016) 1, pp. 86-121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550161
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Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex post. We show that this is achieved by bilateral negotiations but not by auctions. Negotiations strictly outperforms auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096108
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Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Herweg, Fabian; Karle, Heiko; Muller, Daniel - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and profit-maximizing sellers. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiations in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. The type of the concluded long-term contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083642
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Inequity Version and Team Incentives
Rey-Biel, Pedro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823939
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The first-order approach to the principal–agent problems under inequality aversion
Cao, Susumu - In: Operations research letters 41 (2013) 5, pp. 526-529
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191964
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Inequity Aversion and Team Incentives
Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A selfish employer can profitably exploit envy or guilt by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium, i.e., when employees do not meet his demands. Such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851475
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Inequity aversion and team incentives
Biel, Pedro Rey - EconWPA - 2004
We study optimal contracts when employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A ''selfish'' employer can profitably exploit preferences for equity among his employees by offering contracts which create maximum inequity off-equilibrium and thus, leave employees feeling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561803
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Team Formation and Self-serving Biases
Corgnet, Brice - School of Economics and Business Administration, …
There exists extensive evidence that people learn positively about themselves. We build on this finding to develop a model of team formation in the workplace. We show that learning positively about oneself systematically undermines the formation of teams. Agents becoming overconfident tend to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010559841
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A Model for Team Managers with Self-serving Workers
Corgnet, Brice - School of Economics and Business Administration, …
We develop a model of team formation in which workers learn about their level of ability. We show that insufficient cooperation may arise as workers learn positively about their own skills. We then build a model for team managers and establish that their objectivity in assessing coworkers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010559845
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