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  • Search: subject:"behavioral diversity"
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Year of publication
Subject
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behavioral diversity 4 bandit experimentation 2 equilibrium emulation 2 insensitivity to prior 2 least-cost separating equilibrium 2 mimicking 2 non-monotone reputation dynamics 2 perseverance 2 Behavioral diversity 1 Diversity Management 1 Diversity management 1 Equilibrium emulation 1 Experiment 1 Game theory 1 Insensitivity to prior 1 Learning process 1 Least-cost separating equilibrium 1 Lernprozess 1 Reputation 1 Signalling 1 Spieltheorie 1
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Online availability
All
Free 5
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 4 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2 Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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English 5
Author
All
Ishida, Junichiro 5 Suen, Wing-chuen 5
Published in...
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Discussion paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research 2 ISER Discussion Paper 2 Games and economic behavior 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 3 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 5 of 5
Cover Image
Signaling vision: Knowing when to quit
Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2024
We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. This creates opportunities for low types who do not observe any news to mimic high types by quitting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015209998
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Cover Image
Signaling vision : knowing when to quit
Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2024
We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. This creates opportunities for low types who do not observe any news to mimic high types by quitting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015195156
Saved in:
Cover Image
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction : signaling under behavioral diversity
Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Games and economic behavior 147 (2024), pp. 449-459
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135360
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Cover Image
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity
Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2023
We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their … separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540494
Saved in:
Cover Image
Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction : signaling under behavioral diversity
Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing-chuen - 2023
We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their … separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451901
Saved in:
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