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  • Search: subject:"casymmetric information"
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Adverse Selection 1 Asymmetrische Information 1 Casymmetric information 1 Gleichgewicht 1 Spieltheorie 1 Theorie 1 USSR 1 Versicherungsökonomik 1 Vertrag 1 casymmetric information 1 competitive insurance market 1 contract withdrawal 1 hierarchy 1 principal-agent problem 1 transaction costs 1
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Free 2
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Book / Working Paper 2
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Working Paper 1
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English 2
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Markevich, Andrei 1 Mimra, Wanda 1 Wambach, Achim 1
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Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New Economic School (NES) 1
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CESifo Working Paper 1 Working Papers / Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New Economic School (NES) 1
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EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 2 of 2
Did you mean: subject:"asymmetric information" (9,915 results)
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A game-theoretic foundation for the Wilson equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection
Mimra, Wanda; Wambach, Achim - 2011
We extend the seminal Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information in the spirit of Wilson (1977)'s 'anticipatory equilibrium' by introducing an additional stage in which initial contracts can be withdrawn after observation of competitors'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275004
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How Much Control is Enough? Monitoring and Enforcement under Stalin.
Markevich, Andrei - Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), New … - 2007
In hierarchies, agents’ hidden actions increase principals' transactions costs and give rise to a demand for monitoring and enforcement. The fact that the latter are costly raises questions about their scope, organisation, and type. How much control is enough? The paper uses historical records...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005734428
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