Search Results - subject:"coalition structure"

Axiomatizations of public good indices with a priori unions

Alonso-Meijide, José; Casas-Méndez, Balbina; … - In: Social Choice and Welfare 35 (2010) 3, pp. 517-533

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673846

Difference between the position value and the Myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures

Kongo, Takumi - In: International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 4, pp. 669-675

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673952

A Class of Consistent Share Functions for Games in Coalition Structure

van den Brink, René; van der Laan, Gerard - 2001

properties. Weprovide axiomatizations of this class of coalition structure sharefunctions using these consistency and … players in the game.In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the playersare organized into an a priori coalition … structure being a finitepartition of the set of players. We introduce a general method fordefining a class of share functions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325005

A Class of Consistent Share Functions for Games in Coalition Structure

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2001

.In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized into an a priori coalition structure being a … in coalition structure using a multiplication property that states that the share of a player in the total payoff is … between the coalitions. We show that these coalition structure share functions satisfy certain consistency properties. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256541

A Class of Consistent Share Functions for Games in Coalition Structure

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. We introduce a general method for defining a class of share … functions for such games in coalition structure using a multiplication property that states that the share of a player in the … an external game between the coalitions. We show that these coalition structure share functions satisfy certain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281774

A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316871

A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES

KAMIJO, YOSHIO - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (2009) 02, pp. 207-214

In this paper, we study cooperative games with coalition structures. We show that a solution concept that applies the Shapley value to games among and within coalitions and in which the pure surplus that the coalition obtains is allocated among the intra-coalition members in an egalitarian way,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493083

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

Milchtaich, Igal; Winter, Eyal - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2000

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585386

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Watanabe, Naoki; Muto, Shigeo - In: International Journal of Game Theory 37 (2008) 4, pp. 505-523

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178880

A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure

Vidal-Puga, Juan - In: Economic Theory 25 (2005) 3, pp. 679-701

coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition … structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash …The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370769