Search Results - subject:"commitment"

Commitment in Environmental Policy as an Entry-Deterrence Tool

Espinola-Arredondo, Ana; Munoz-Garcia, Felix - School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

?exible environmental policy. We show that commitment becomes socially optimal when its associated welfare loss, due to a stringent fee …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225739

The role of psychological reactance and relationship proneness in the commitment decision: An application to a dental prevention program.

Prim-Allaz, Isabelle; Darpy, Denis - Université Paris-Dauphine

As commitment is at the core of relationship programs, the latter should share similarities with prevention programs … the practitioner are key determinants to commitment to a prevention protocol. In addition, psychological reactance and … relationship proneness are shown as antecedents of the commitment predictors. While reactant people may not commit to prevention …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008828430

Peu de consommateurs fidèles habitent au paradis.

Bozzo, Cécile; Merunka, Dwight; Moulins, Jean-Louis - Université Paris-Dauphine

Les acheteurs réguliers d’une marque peuvent y être fidèles s’ils possèdent des attitudes fortes et positives vis-à-vis de la marque, source d’engagement dans une relation à long terme avec la marque. Ils peuvent aussi acheter la marque régulièrement par habitude et pour des...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008924651

Optimal Monetary Stabilization Policy

Woodford, Michael - In: Handbook of Monetary Economics

commitment for a superior stabilization outcome, and more generally, the importance of advance signals about the future conduct … target criterion as a way of characterizing a central bank's policy commitment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002668

Reputations in Repeated Games

Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - Elsevier

This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived player, who may be a â€œnormalâ€ type or one of a number of â€œcommitmentâ€ types, and who faces a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255417

Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation

Pollrich, Martin; Schmidt, Robert - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

A unilateral policy intervention by a country (such as the introduction of an emission price) can induce firms to relocate to other countries. We analyze a dynamic game where a regulator offers contracts to avert relocation of a firm in each of two periods. The firm can undertake a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189118

Zielgruppenspezifische Mitarbeiterbindung in der kundenorientierten Vertriebssparkasse. Eine gestaltungsorientierte Forschungsarbeit

Thaler, Michael (contributor) - Rainer Hampp Verlag

Aufgrund der demografischen Entwicklung, der steigenden Wettbewerbsanforderungen und wachsenden Kundenanspruechen wird eine hohe emotionale Mitarbeiterbindung in den kommenden Jahren fuer die Sparkassen als regionale Finanzdienstleister zum erfolgskritischen Faktor werden. Daher ist es...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206937

Mediated Audits

Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

results provide a proper benchmark for studying audits under limited commitment, and provide insights on the institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199119

Mediated Audits

Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

results provide a proper benchmark for studying audits under limited commitment, and provide insights on the institutional …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268449

The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -

Pollrich, Martin - Berlin Doctoral Program in Economics and Management Science

For optimal audit contracts the principle of maximum deterrence applies: penalties imposed by the contract are either zero or at their maximal level. Additionally, an imperfect audit technology which reveals the agent’s type only with an error makes the principal worse off. In this paper I...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011268453