Search Results - subject:"communication complexity"

Nash implementation with little communication

Segal, Ilya R. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1, pp. 51-71

The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social …-stage mechanisms allow a drastic reduction in communication complexity. Namely, for an important subclass of intersection … communication complexity of Nash implementation for discrete communication measured in bits, or a reduction from infinite- to low …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599423

Nash implementation with little communication

Segal, Ilya R. - In: Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) 1

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545871

Nash implementation with little communication

Segal, Ilya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 5 (2010) 1, pp. 51-71

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698623

Compiling the Votes of a Subelectorate

Maudet, Nicolas; Lang, Jérôme; Chevaleyre, Yann; … - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009

communication complexity. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011072290

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Algorithmic mechanism design : through the lens of multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498308

The communication burden of payment determination

Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Schapira, Michael - In: Games and Economic Behavior 77 (2013) 1, pp. 153-167

In the presence of self-interested parties, mechanism designers typically aim to implement some social-choice function in an equilibrium. This paper studies the cost of such equilibrium requirements in terms of communication. While a certain amount of information x needs to be communicated just...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603336

Mechanism design with a restricted action space

Blumrosen, Liad; Feldman, Michal - In: Games and economic behavior 82 (2013), pp. 424-443

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010243694

Testing substitutability

Hatfield, John William; Immorlica, Nicole; Kominers, … - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 639-645

We provide an algorithm for testing the substitutability of a length-N preference relation over a set of contracts X in time O(|X|3⋅N3). Access to the preference relation is essential for this result: We show that a substitutability-testing algorithm with access only to an agentʼs choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049779

Communication and efficiency in auctions

Kos, Nenad - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 1, pp. 233-249

We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010573658