In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of...

In this article, policies are negotiated in a committee by playing a dynamic voting game with an endogenous default (or status quo) policy. I show that joining a committee by maintaining a strong agenda setting power is a way for a decision maker to commit to a policy that in absence of...

Given a Heath–Jarrow–Morton (HJM) interest rate model $\mathcal{M}$ and a parametrized family of finite dimensional forward rate curves $\mathcal{G}$, this paper provides a technique for projecting the infinite dimensional forward rate curve rt given by $\mathcal{M}$ onto the finite...